COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT

EASA PAD No.: 26-117

[Published on 28 September 2026 and officially closed for comments on 26 October 2026]

Commenter 1: European Sailplane manufacturers – Werner Scholz – 07/10/2026

Comment # 1

I. DG Aviation informed pilots about this issue on their homepage on 17.06.2026. At that time, the info went out to pilots / owners / operators of DG-800B, DG-800C, DG-500M and DG-500MB powered sailplane variants. Now in the PAD it is only DG-500 M, DG-500 MB and DG-800 B powered sailplanes. Is the DG-800 C (DG homepage name) or DG-808 C (in the TCDS) variant therefore not affected or is it? I do realize that the TN is written just for those variants listed in the PAD, but I also looked up the first homepage information.

II. Pilot-owner authorisation:
The PAD would allow a pilot-owner to do point (1), i.e. the fuel hose inspection. The TN says that the pilot-owner shall not release to service this inspection - he is only allowed to exchange some pages in the maintenance manual. What is now possible for the pilot-owner?

III. Corrective actions time schedule
The TN and the PAD asks for inspection within 30 days. Then if cracks or other damage found it asks for replacement within 30 days or before next flight. Some thoughts about that:
If I postpone the inspection I could fly for another 29 days (even if it is damaged and even if it is leaking?
If I find a damage why is there the additional 30 day period as engine operation is essentially already prohibited thereafter and as I have to replace the part anyhow after 3 months?

EASA response:

I. ***Comment noted. The DG-808C powered sailplane is not affected, since this model has a different type of injector valve, without the crimped-on piece of fuel hose.***
No changes have been made to the Final AD in response to this comment.

II. ***Comment agreed. The Final AD has been revised accordingly.***

III. ***Comment noted. The compliance times specified in the AD were established following an assessment of the identified unsafe condition, taking into account both the potential consequences of failure and the available service experience. EASA determined that the unsafe condition warrants corrective action within a defined period; however, the available data do not indicate a risk level requiring immediate***

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grounding of affected aircraft or the issuance of an Emergency AD. EASA also notes that the affected aircraft may be operated in a manner that does not require use of the engine. For this reason, and in view of the assessed risk, the AD allows a limited period between identification of damage and accomplishment of the terminating action. This compliance time provides operators with sufficient flexibility to obtain parts and schedule maintenance while maintaining an acceptable level of safety. Operators remain free to accomplish the replacement immediately following the inspection if they consider this appropriate.

In response to this comment, paragraph (1) of this AD has been revised to require accomplishment of the inspection before next use of the engine or within 30 days, whichever occurs later, after the effective date of this AD. This clarification was introduced to ensure that an operator cannot continue operating an affected engine for an extended period solely by relying on the 30-day calendar compliance time. This approach is consistent with the risk assessment underlying this AD and ensures timely identification of any crack, leak or other damage addressed by the required inspection.

The Final AD has been revised accordingly.

Commenter 2: Egbert Veldhuizen – 28/09/2026

Comment # 2

I. Pilot-Owner Authorisation:
Paragraph (5) Inspection of the fuel hoses as required by paragraph (1) of this AD may be accomplished by the pilot-owner under the provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, M.A.803 or ML.A.803, as applicable. Besides “Inspection” also allow the Pilot Owner to replace the faulty part and issue a CRS. The PAD refers to M.A. 803. Is this correct? As Gliders are subject to part ML and not Part M of 1321/2014?

II. Reason: An occurrence of loss of engine power during self-launch operation has been reported. Relevant investigation identified rupture of an affected part as root cause. From this I conclude that only one occurrence is known. Statistically not very relevant. And in my opinion, it is an overkill to replace all systems in the field. Within 3 months. Why not prescribe an inspection prior to each flight. If no discrepancies are found the primer+ hose can be used. And prior to next flight check the hose for wear and damage and so on. Rationale: if the hose is not damaged, it does not need replacement. Further the method described in TN500-18 maybe worse than the problem.

EASA response:

I. Comment noted. See reply to Comment #1, point II.

II. Comment noted. The determination of whether AD action is necessary is not based solely on the number of reported occurrences, but on whether an unsafe condition has been identified and whether that condition is likely to exist or develop in other products. In this case, the

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investigation of a reported loss of engine power during self-launch operation identified rupture of the fuel hose assembly as the root cause. EASA considers that failure of this component can result in fuel leakage in the engine compartment, with the potential for loss of engine power and subsequent fire, which constitutes an unsafe condition. While only one occurrence has been reported, EASA agrees with DG Aviation GmbH that the event is representative of a design and ageing-related vulnerability that may affect other aircraft equipped with the same hose assemblies. The absence of additional reported failures does not eliminate the identified risk, particularly considering the age of the affected parts and the potentially hazardous consequences of failure. EASA also considered alternative measures, including repetitive pre-flight inspections. However, such inspections cannot provide the same level of risk mitigation as removal of the affected parts because internal deterioration, ageing effects, or damage mechanisms leading to rupture may not be detectable during routine visual checks. Consequently, EASA determined that replacement of the affected hose assemblies within the prescribed compliance time is the necessary corrective action to restore an acceptable level of safety.
No changes have been made to the Final AD in response to this comment.

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